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Abstract
We consider a retailer that sells a product with uncertain demand over a finite selling season. The retailer sets
an initial stocking quantity and, at some predetermined point in the season, optimally marks down remaining
inventory. We modify this classic setting by introducing three types of consumers: myopic consumers, who
always purchase at the initial full price; bargain-hunting consumers, who purchase only if the discounted price
is sufficiently low; and strategic consumers, who strategically choose when to make their purchase. A strategic
consumer chooses between a purchase at the initial full price and a later purchase at an uncertain markdown
price. In equilibrium, strategic consumers and the retailer make optimal decisions given their rational
expectations regarding future prices, availability of inventory, and the behavior of other consumers. We find
that the retailer stocks less, takes smaller price discounts, and earns lower profit if strategic consumers are
present than if there are no strategic consumers. We find that a retailer should generally avoid committing to a
price path over the season (assuming such commitment is feasible)—committing to a markdown price (or to
not mark down at all) is often too costly (inventory may remain unsold) even in the presence of strategic
consumers; the better approach is to be cautious with the initial quantity and then mark down optimally.
Furthermore, we discuss the value of quick response (the ability to procure additional inventory after
obtaining updated demand information, albeit at a higher unit cost than the initial order). We find that the
value of quick response to a retailer is generally much greater in the presence of strategic consumers than
without them: on average 67% more valuable and as much as 558% more valuable in our sample. In other
words, although it is well established in the literature that quick response provides value by allowing better
matching of supply with demand, it provides more value, often substantially more value, by allowing a retailer
to control the negative consequences of strategic consumer behavior.
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We consider a retailer that sells a product with uncertain demand over a nite selling season.
The retailer sets an initial stocking quantity and, at some predetermined point in the season,
optimally marks down remaining inventory. We modify this classic setting by introducing three
types of consumers: myopic consumers, who always purchase at the initial full price; bargain-
hunting consumers, who purchase only if the discounted price is su¢ ciently low; and strategic
consumers, who strategically choose when to make their purchase. A strategic consumer chooses
between a purchase at the initial full price and a later purchase at an uncertain markdown price.
In equilibrium, strategic consumers and the retailer make optimal decisions given their rational
expectations regarding future prices, availability of inventory and the behavior of other consumers.
We nd that the retailer stocks less, takes smaller price discounts and earns lower prot if strategic
consumers are present than if there are no strategic consumers. We nd that a retailer should
generally avoid committing to a price path over the season (assuming such commitment is feasible)
- committing to a markdown price (or to not markdown at all) is often too costly (inventory may
remain unsold) even in the presence of strategic consumers; the better approach is to be cautious
with the initial quantity, and then markdown optimally. Furthermore, we discuss the value of quick
response (the ability to procure additional inventory after obtaining updated demand information,
albeit at a higher unit cost than the initial order). We nd that the value of quick response to
a retailer is generally much greater in the presence of strategic consumers than without them: on
average 67% more valuable and as much as 558% more valuable, in our sample. In other words,
although it is well established in the literature that quick response provides value by allowing
better matching of supply with demand, it provides more value, often substantially more value, by
allowing a retailer to control the negative consequences of strategic consumer behavior.
1 Introduction
Retailers are increasingly cognizant of the fact that modern consumers are educated, sophisticated,
and willing to go to extraordinary lengths to purchase goods at the lowest possible price (Silverstein
and Butman 2006). One common and powerful tactic consumers use to achieve this goal is to wait
to purchase items only when they are on sale or clearance, a strategy aided by the fact that many
retailers have predictable seasonal markdown patterns and o¤er deep discounts (e.g., Warner and
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Barsky 1995 report an average markdown of 39% on mens sweaters over a four month period).
Customers who behave in this manner are referred to in the academic literature as strategic or
rational consumers: they are non-myopic utility maximizers who recognize that a desired product
is likely to be reduced in price at some point in time and they take these future markdowns
into account, along with the expected availability of the product, when timing their purchasing
decisions. All too often, as a result, strategic consumers choose to wait for markdowns, thereby
denying retailers full price sales (Rozhon 2004).
ODonnell (2006) suggests retailers can employ the following two tactics to induce strategic
consumers to purchase products at full price: limit quantities to avoid the need for deep markdowns
and promote a¤ordable full prices. Perhaps no rm is more successful at implementing these tactics
than Zara, the Spanish fashion retailer. Since its inception, Zara has recognized the importance
of minimizing the number and severity of markdowns in its retail outlets. As a result, Zara
generated only 15-20% of its sales at markdown prices as compared to 30-40% for its European peers
(Ghemawat and Nueno 2003). To execute this strategy, Zara monitors and replenishes inventory
frequently in stores (as often as twice a week) and produces 85% of its in-house inventory during
the fashion season in which it is sold, as compared to 0-20% at most of its competitors (Ghemawat
and Nueno 2003). This quick response capability comes with a price: Zara produces much of its
merchandise in Europe, which has relatively expensive labor compared to outsourced production
in Asia, and Zara frequently expedites shipments via expensive transportation methods such as air
freight (Ferdows et al. 2004).
In this paper we study the interaction between a retailers stocking decision and its markdown
strategy in the presence of strategic consumers. Strategic consumers choose between either buying
an item early in the selling season at the full price or waiting until later in the season when the
item may be marked down in price. Waiting for the potential deal has several drawbacks from the
consumers perspective: the strategic consumer values purchasing the item less at the end of the
season than at the start of the season (e.g., a barbecue is more valuable at the start of summer than
at the end of summer); the consumer does not know for sure whether the item will be marked down
and if so, by how much, i.e., the consumer faces pricing risk; and the item may not be available.
Furthermore, availability and pricing are interconnected; if availability is high, the retailer is likely
to o¤er a deep discount, whereas if inventory is limited (either because the retailer was conservative
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with her initial buy or because demand turns out to be greater than expected), the markdown will
be modest, assuming the item is reduced in price at all. However, the potential benet of waiting is
clear: the markdown may indeed be substantial, thereby providing the consumer with a great value.
For example, a strategic consumer may be willing to purchase a barbecue for $350 at the start of
summer but may prefer the chance to purchase it at the end of summer for 50% o¤ the initial
price. Thus, we seek to identify the set of rational expectation equilibria in our model: the retailer
chooses an optimal order quantity and markdown price given her expectation of consumer behavior
and consumers choose an optimal purchasing strategy given their expectations of the behavior of
the retailer and the other consumers.
Based on our stylized model, we address several questions. Under what conditions is it optimal
to restrict quantities when facing strategic consumers? How do strategic consumers inuence
a retailers markdown strategy? Should a retailer commit to a price path throughout the selling
season (i.e., commit to a specic markdown price or to not mark down at all) or is the retailer better
o¤ with a dynamic pricing strategy that sets an optimal markdown given the available inventory
and initial sales? What is the potential loss in prot if a retailer ignores strategic behavior? Finally,
what is the value of quick response capabilities in the presence of strategic consumers? It is well
known that quick response provides substantial value to a retailer when consumers are assumed to
be entirely myopic (i.e., non-strategic) because quick response allows a retailer to exploit updated
information to better match supply with uncertain demand: with a quick response capability the
retailer makes smaller inventory investments to mitigate the consequences of left over inventory
while using the ability to replenish to lessen the opportunity cost of lost sales. Is the incremental
value of quick response greater or smaller in the presence of strategic consumers? The answer to
this question is critical for understanding whether or not a rm should invest in quick response
capabilities, such as Zaras investments in localized production and expedited shipments.
The remainder is the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and §3
describes the model. Section 4 analyzes the retailers prot function, while §5 addresses the
consumer best response function and §6 examines the equilibrium of the game. Section 7 considers
the value of quick response inventory practices, §8 reports results from a numerical analysis, and
§9 concludes with a summary of the answers to our research questions.
3
2 Related Literature
A wide variety of models characterized by supply and demand mismatches have recently emerged
that explicitly incorporate consumer preferences or behavior. Examples include competing over
price and service level for a random number of customers (Deneckere and Peck 1995), service
level stimulating demand (Dana and Petruzzi 2001), capacity management via reservations in a
restaurant facing uncertain demand (Alexandrov and Lariviere 2006), strategic joining of queues
by arriving customers (Veeraraghavan and Debo 2005), and competing for rational consumers
when relative product value is uncertain (Swinney 2007). The most relevant of these models to
our analysis are those concerning multiperiod pricing.
Multiperiod pricing models are generally characterized by rms selling to consumers with un-
known or heterogeneous valuations. Inventories are typically xed, but the rm has the ability
to change the price over time, exploiting this ability to price discriminate between consumers or
to discover information about their valuations. For example, Lazear (1986) explains a variety of
observed retail pricing phenomena via a xed-inventory, two-period pricing framework with myopic
consumers who purchase if their valuation of the product exceeds the price.
The addition of strategic consumers to the dynamic pricing problem is addressed by Besanko
and Winston (1990), who model an uncapacitated, monopolistic retailer selling to a xed number of
heterogeneous, rational consumers over an arbitrary number of periods. The presence of strategic
consumers leads to lower prices in each period than would be optimal with myopic consumers, be-
cause the retailer competes intertemporally with itself (i.e., consumers have the option to wait until
a later period to purchase). There is no uncertainty in the model, thus there is no risk of stock-
outs or left over inventory. More recently, several paper analyze various aspects of the markdown
problem with strategic consumers and xed inventories, including multi-unit customer demand (El-
maghraby et al. 2006a), pre-announced markdown policies with reservations (Elmaghraby et al.
2006b), continuously declining consumer valuations (Aviv and Pazgal 2005), uncertain, evolving
consumer valuations (Gallego and S¸ahin 2006), and heterogeneous consumer populations (Su 2005).
Several recent papers study how a retailers initial stocking level is a¤ected by strategic con-
sumers. In each case the price path over the selling season is xed (either exogenously set or chosen
by the retailer at the start of the selling season). Yin and Tang (2006) compare the e¢ cacy of two
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di¤erent in-store display formats to manipulate consumer expectations regarding the availability
of inventory. (In our model the retailer can inuence consumer expectations only via its order
quantity decision.) Liu and van Ryzin (2005) nd that if consumers are risk-averse, even if demand
is deterministic, it is optimal for the retailer to create a rationing risk by understocking initially to
induce consumers to purchase early. (In our model consumers are risk neutral.) Su and Zhang
(2005) conclude that several types of contracts can coordinate the supply chain when consumers
are strategic, including, surprisingly, wholesale price contracts.
Our model is distinct along several key dimensions. In our model the retailer chooses both an
initial stocking level and its markdown price dynamically. In other words, an optimal markdown
is chosen given initial season sales and remaining inventory: a greater discount is o¤ered if either
initial sales are weak or if there is a substantial amount of inventory remaining. (Cachon and Kök
2002 study a similar model of optimal dynamic markdowns, but they do not consider the presence
of strategic consumers.) Consequently, in our model consumers face price risk: they do not know
for sure how deep a future markdown may be. Furthermore, our results do not depend on the
presence of rationing/availability riskeven if consumers know in our model that a unit will be
available in the markdown period, they still face a trade-o¤ between purchasing now at the full
price and waiting for the uncertain markdown. Yin and Tang (2006), Liu and van Ryzin (2005)
and Su and Zhang (2005) assume a xed price path, so consumers in their models do not face price
risk. Instead, the interesting dynamics in their models are generated exclusively via rationing risk:
a strategic consumer makes a trade-o¤ between buying for sure at the full price now and buying
later at the markdown price if the product is available.
Our model allows us to study the value of using dynamic pricing relative to committing to a
xed price path. Besanko and Winston 1990 nd, in their model, that a retailer does benet from
a commitment to a price path. Aviv and Pazgal (2005) do numerically evaluate whether a retailer
is better o¤ committing to a price path or choosing an optimal markdown price (given the initial
xed quantity of inventory) and nd that commitment is generally better for the retailer. Dasu
and Tong (2005) nd that posted pricing schemes perform nearly optimally with xed quantities,
and are usually preferred to contingent pricing schemes. Our results are di¤erent: when a retailer
is able to choose the initial stocking quantity and its markdown price, the retailer is generally better
o¤ dynamically pricing rather than committing to a markdown price. As a result, in our setting,
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even if a retailer could commit to a price path (e.g., due to repeated game dynamics, as assumed
by Liu and van Ryzin (2005)), the retailer is generally not better o¤ doing so.
Another important distinction of our analysis is that we investigate the value of quick response
capabilities in the presence of strategic consumers. There is a broad literature documenting the
large benet of quick response in a supply chain (e.g., Barnes-Schuster et al. 2002; Eppen and Iyer
1997; Fisher and Raman 1996; Fisher et al. 2001; Iyer and Bergen 1997; Jones et al. 2001; Petruzzi
and Dada 2001). However, to the best of our knowledge, the inuence of strategic consumer
behavior on the value of quick response has not been addressed.
3 Model Description
We model a single rm (the retailer) selling a single product over two periods. In the rst period,
the retailer sells the product at a xed, exogenous full price p:1 In the second period, the product
is sold for the markdown price s. We refer to the rst period as the full priceperiod and the
second period as the saleor salvageperiod.
The retailer has two decisions: sale price and initial stocking quantity. The sale price is chosen
at the start of the second period to maximize revenue, R (s; I), where I is the inventory available
at the beginning of the second period. Prior to the rst period, the stocking level q is chosen to
maximize total expected prot,  (q). We assume initially that production leadtimes are long
enough that there is only one purchasing opportunity (this assumption is relaxed in §7).
The unit procurement cost to the retailer is c. Any inventory remaining at the end of the
second period has zero value. The total number of customers that may purchase in the rst period
is a random variable D  0 with distribution F (), complementary cdf F () = 1 F (), and density
f (). We assume that D satises the following property.
Denition 1 A continuous, non-negative random variable X with density f satises themonotone
scaled likelihood ratio (MSLR) property if, for all   1 and x in the support of X, f (x) =f (x)
is monotonic in x.
1See the online appendix for a discussion of the initial pricing decision. Roughly speaking, we nd that the presence
of strategic consumers lowers the optimal rst period price because the rm needs to o¤er the those consumers an
incentive to buy in the early period. Consequently, markdowns become less deep relative to the initial full price.
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This property is satised by many commonly used non-negative distributions, including the
gamma, Weibull, uniform, exponential, power, beta, chi, and chi-squared distributions (see the
online appendix).2 It is related to the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property (Karlin and
Rubin 1956). In fact, if the distribution in question can be characterized by a scale parameter and
satises the MLR property, then the distribution satises the MSLR property.
The population of consumers is divided into three distinct segments with the following charac-
teristics (summarized in Table 1):
Bargain Hunting Consumers. Bargain hunting consumers only purchase the product when
it is on sale. These consumers do not even consider the product in the full price period, possibly
because they do not physically visit the retailer, because their valuation is less than p in the rst
period, or because they derive some utility from getting a good deal. Best Buy, for example,
has famously labeled these customers as devils, in contrast with Best Buys favorite customers,
referred to as angels,who purchase at the full price (McWilliams 2004). In the sale period, each
bargain hunter has value vB for the item, and so her surplus from purchasing an item is vB   s:
There are an unlimited number of bargain hunters and they purchase, like the other segments,
whenever their surplus is non-negative.3 These consumers are analogous to the salvage market in
a newsvendor formulation; as such, we make the usual assumption that vB < c.
Myopic Consumers. Myopic consumers are the opposite of bargain hunters in the sense
that they only purchase in the rst period. The rst period valuation of each myopic consumer is
vM  p, and these consumers comprise a fraction (1 ) of the initial (rst period) demand. Thus,
there are a total of (1   )D myopic consumers that visit the retailer in the rst period, where
 2 [0; 1] and D is a random variable. Myopic consumers only purchase in the rst period (and
at the full price), either because they are unwilling to return to the retailer in the second period,
because their value for the item in the second period is low (e.g., if their value is vB or lower they
clearly always prefer to purchase in the rst period), or because they are simply shortsighted.4
Strategic Consumers. Both myopic and bargain hunting consumers only have one decision:
2The only result dependent on this assumption is the equilibrium existence result, for which the MSLR property
is a su¢ cient, but not a necessary, condition. We have numerically observed that an equilibrium exists for many
distributions that do not satisfy the MSLR assumption, such as the truncated normal.
3We have results for the comparable model with a nite number of bargain hunters. This change does not alter
the qualitative results, but does complicate the analysis of equilibrium.
4Su (2006) and Su (2007b) explore in detail how bounded rationality can inuence the dynamics of a market.
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to purchase, or not to purchase. The nal group of consumers have an additional decision: when
to purchase. Thus, these consumers are the strategic segment in the sense that they are non-
myopic. They consider their surplus from purchasing the product at the full price and their surplus
from purchasing the product on sale, choosing between the two to maximize their expected surplus.
There are D strategic consumers and, like myopic consumers, they each have value vM for the
item in the rst period. Consequently, variation in  alters the degree of sophistication in the
consumer population without altering the underlying valuations or the number of consumers (i.e.,
there are always D consumers in the rst period with value vM , and a fraction  of these are
strategic).
In the sale period, strategic consumers values for the item are uniformly distributed in the
interval [v; v] ; where v  p and v  vM   p+ vB.5 The lower bound on v is not restrictive, as any
strategic consumer with value less than vM   p+ vB may be thought of as a myopic consumer (i.e.,
that consumer always purchases in the rst period). The upper bound on v ensures that markups
are never optimal and that all consumer values weakly decline over time (since p  vM ), reective
of either seasonality in the product or of discounting of future consumption.6 For notational
convenience, we dene G () and g () to be, respectively, the distribution and density functions of
strategic consumer valuations, with G () = 1 G ().
An alternative interpretation of our model is that strategic consumers are heterogeneous in their
cost to delay their purchase or their discount factor: their period 2 value for the item is v; where
the discount factor, ; is uniformly distributed on the interval [v=v; v=v]: Consumers with period 2
value v are the most patient (i.e., a delay in consumption is least costly to them), so they are the
most likely to wait for a potential sale.7
5Uniform values lead to a linear demand curve in the sale period. In addition, much of the consumer behavior
and multiperiod pricing literature assumes uniformly distributed valuations (e.g., Desai et al. 2007 and Lazear 1986).
Although we have not established the existence of an equilibrium for more general distributions, we have observed
numerically that an equilibrium exists with any increasing generalized failure rate distribution (see Lariviere 2006).
Our subsquent results continue to hold analytically for more general distributions, conditional on the existence of an
equilibrium.
6The model can also be solved with v  vM , so long as markups are not allowed (i.e., s  p). This case is
notationally cumbersome, and so is omitted for ease of exposition.
7An alternative model has consumer heterogeneity in their period 1 value for the item, v 2 [v; v] ; and a common
discount factor, ; so that their period 2 value is v: In that model the consumers with the highest initial value have
the most to lose from delayed consumption so they are the most likely to purchase in period 1. Nevertheless, we
anticipate that our qualitative conclusions continue to hold in that model; the rms period 2 discount still depends
on period 1 inventory, which is inuenced by whether the rm has quick response capabilities or not.
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Segment Number Period 1 Valuation Period 2 Valuation
Myopic (1 - α)D v M -
Strategic αD v M V
Bargain Hunters Infinity - v B
Table 1. Characteristics of the three consumer segements. V = [v; v] is the interval of strategic consumer
second period valuations.
The retailer and all consumers know the values of vB; vM ; v; v and .8 Each strategic consumer
has private knowledge of his or her own second period valuation at the start of the game. All
strategic consumers arrive in the rst period and, should they nd the product in-stock, decide
to either purchase the product at that time or wait for the sale, whichever gives them the highest
expected surplus, which is dened to be the di¤erence between the consumers valuation and the
purchase price.9 If the product is not available, the consumer receives zero surplus, and we assume
that consumers purchase the product if their surplus is greater than or equal to zero. The surplus
to a strategic consumer when purchasing in the rst period is vM  p, while we denote the expected
surplus from purchasing in the sale period by  (v), where v is a strategic consumers second period
valuation.
The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 2. We model the game between the retailer and
the strategic consumers as simultaneous. In other words, the retailer is incapable of credibly
committing to a specic quantity (i.e., consumers do not observe the inventory level when making
a purchasing decision).10 Each player in the game (the retailer and each individual consumer)
8This is more restrictive than necessary, so we make this assumption for convenience. For example, a consumer
needs to know her own valuation and needs to form an expectation that there will be a deep discount in the second
period. We then require that the expectation is consistent with practice, e.g., if the consumer expects a deep discount
50% of the time, then in fact a deep discount is o¤erred 50% of the time. We do not discuss how these expectations
are formed, but see Liu and van Ryzin (2007) and Gans (2002) for models in which consumers learn about their
environment.
9Alternatively, strategic consumers might choose a purchase period before traveling to the store; the resulting
model is identical, so long as these consumers are committed to shop in one of the two periods. An interesting
extension incorporates an option to not shop at all and an explicit cost to shop, as in Dana and Petruzzi (2001). In
that case, rst period demand can be increasing in the inventory level: by choosing a higher rst period availability,
consumers are more likely to shop relative to the not shop at all option given that shopping is costly. This e¤ect
argues for a higher initial stocking quantity, which counteracts the e¤ect we identify for a lower initial stocking
quantity.
10This does not mean that the retailers stocking quantity has no inuence on consumer behavior. Consumer
behavior depends on their expectation of the retailers stocking quantity and in equilibrium that expectation must
be correct. Thus, the retailers stocking quantity inuences consumer behavior through their long run expectation.
We also considered an extension of the model in which consumers observe q before making their decisions (i.e., a
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Period 1 Period 2
Retailer
determines the
stocking level.
Myopic and strategic consumers visit
the retailer, and strategic consumers
choose to purchase now or wait for
the sale.
Retailer sets
the sale
price.
Bargain hunting
consumers and any
strategic consumers
who waited purchase.
Excess
inventory
salvaged
for zero.
Figure 2. The sequence of events in the base model.
possesses beliefs about the actions of the other players. Throughout, we use the hat symbol (
b ) to denote beliefs. For example, consumers believe that the stocking level of the retailer is bq.
When we wish to make explicit the dependence of the the retailers prot on beliefs, we denote
the prot function  (q; bv), where bv represents the beliefs about consumer behavior. (The precise
nature of bv will be discussed later.) Similarly, the second period surplus of a strategic consumer
with valuation v can be written  (v; bv; bq), which highlights the fact that each consumer possesses
beliefs about both the actions of the retailer and the actions of other consumers.
We seek to identify a rational expectations equilibrium (see Muth 1961, and operational applica-
tions by Besanko and Winston 1990 and Su and Zhang 2005). A rational expectations equilibrium
ensures that the beliefs of all players are consistent with the equilibrium outcome. Hence, all
consumers have the same beliefs about the retailers behavior and the behavior of other consumers,
which leads to the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1 In a rational expectations equilibrium, there exists some v 2 [v; v] such that all strategic
consumers with second period value less than v purchase in the rst period, and all consumers
with value greater than v wait for the sale period. A consumer with value v is indi¤erent between
purchasing in the rst or second periods.
Proof. The proofs of all lemmas appear in the technical appendix.
sequential game with the retailer moving rst). This clearly works to the advantage of the retailer: by directly
inuencing consumer expectations the retailer can be no worse o¤. Nevertheless, our qualitative conclusions continue
to hold.
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As a result of Lemma 1, we may simplify the action space of the strategic consumers. Rather
than concern ourselves with the purchasing decision of each individual consumer, we may consider
instead the equilibrium value threshold v (bq) that is induced by bq. We refer to v (bq) as the
consumer best response correspondence. (Note that we do not claim now, nor is it true in general,
that there is a unique best reply to a given bq.) Given Lemma 1 and v (bq), we may now dene the
equilibrium to this game. The following three sections proceed to characterize the RE equilibrium.
Denition 2 A rational expectations (RE) equilibrium (q; v) to the game between the re-
tailer and strategic consumers satises:
1. The retailer plays a best response given beliefs about consumer behavior: q 2 argmaxq0  (q; bv);
2. The consumers play a best response given beliefs about retailer behavior: v 2 v (bq);
3. Beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcome: bq = q, bv = v.
4 The Retailers Prot Function
In this section, we rst derive the retailers optimal sale price, which is chosen at the start of
the second period. We then analyze the retailers initial stocking decision, and demonstrate that
the retailers prot function is quasi-concave in q, a critical feature for proving existence of an
equilibrium in §6.
4.1 Pricing in the Sale Period
As a consequence of Lemma 1, the retailers only rational belief is that the proportion   1 G (bv)
of total rst period demand attempts to purchase in the rst period. (Although some consumers
may be indi¤erent between the two periods, indi¤erent consumers have measure zero and their
behavior is therefore inconsequential to the retailer.) The retailers expected prot given belief bv
is thus
 (q; bv) = E hpmin (q; D)  cq +max
s
R (s; I)
i
; (1)
where the on-hand inventory at the start of the sale period is I = (q   D)+. Given a sale price
s, consumers purchase the product if their valuation weakly exceeds s; thus, the retailers second
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period revenue function is
R (s; I) =
8>>>><>>>>:
smin
 
G (s)D; I

if v  s  bv
smin
 
G (bv)D; I if bv > s > vB
sI if s  vB
:
The following lemma demonstrates the form of the optimal sale period pricing policy given this
revenue function.
Lemma 2 Dene the critical demand levels Dl = q=
 
 + smG (sm)=sl

, Dm = q=
 
 +G (sm)

,
and Dh = q=, where l;m; and h stand for low, medium, and high, respectively. Then given a
demand level D, there is a unique optimal sale price determined by
s(D) =
8>>>><>>>>:
sh (D) if Dm < D  Dh
sm if Dl < D  Dm
sl if D  Dl
;
where sl = vB is the low sale price, sm = argmaxsbv s (v   s) is the medium sale price, and sh (D) =
(v   v) (D   q) =D + bv is the high sale price, which is contingent on the demand realization and
remaining inventory.
The form of the optimal policy is natural (see Figure 3). If demand is greater than Dh, the
retailer sells out in the rst period. If demand is between Dh and Dm, the retailer sets the highest
price that clears inventory (selling only to the strategic segment). If demand is between Dm and
Dl, the retailer has ample inventory and chooses the revenue maximizing price to serve the strategic
segment (and some inventory is left unsold). Finally, if demand is less than Dl, there is a large
amount of inventory at the start of the sale period, so the retailer prices to clear all remaining
inventory with the lowest sale price. In fact, if all consumers are myopic (i.e.,  = 0) then Dl = q;
which implies the clearance price is deterministically equal to sl in period 2.
4.2 The Initial Inventory Decision
By substituting the optimal sale price function from Lemma 2 into the retailers prot function in
(1), we may analyze the retailers initial inventory decision. The following lemma demonstrates
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Figure 3. The optimal sale price as a function of D.
that the retailers prot function is unimodal.
Lemma 3 The retailers prot  (q; bv) is quasi-concave in q, and the optimal order quantity is
determined by the unique solution to the rst order condition,
d (q; bv)
dq
= p  c  pF (Dh) + slF (Dl) +
Z Dh
Dm
(2sh (x)  v) dF (x) = 0: (2)
Unlike the prot function in a traditional newsvendor model (which corresponds to our model
with no strategic consumers,  = 0); the retailers prot function is generally not concave. To
illustrate why, part (a) of Figure 4 plots the retailers prot function in the simple case with deter-
ministic demand, v = v = sh (i.e., homogeneous strategic consumers), (1  )D myopic consumers
and D strategic consumers, when the retailer expects all strategic consumers to purchase in the
sale period. The retailer sells the rst (1  )D units to the myopic consumers and the next D
units to the strategics at a lower marginal rate. Only when initial inventory is quite ample, above
D+ (sh  sl)D=sl, does the retailer choose to clear at the low sales price, sl. Thus, the retailers
prot function exhibits a concave-convex shape. Part (b) of Figure 4 plots the corresponding prot
function for a newsvendor model ( = 0). Note, relative to the maximum prot at the optimal
order quantity, with strategic consumers the retailer is less sensitive to under ordering (i.e., the
prot loss from a cautious order is less than in the traditional newsvendor model) and the retailer
is more sensitive to over ordering (i.e., ordering too much reduces prot more quickly).
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D(1 –α)D D + (sh - sl)αD/sl
(a) αD Strategic Consumers and Subgame Perfect Salvaging (b) D Myopic Consumers
m = sl - c
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D
q
Figure 4. (a) An example of non-concavity of the retailers prot function with deterministic demand, all
strategic consumers purchasing in period two, and all strategic consumers with valuations equal to sh (m
denotes slope or margin). (b) The retailers prot function in the same example with  = 0.
5 The Best Response of Strategic Consumers
According to Lemma 1, the strategic consumer with value v (bq) is indi¤erent between purchasing
in either period. This consumers second period surplus is non-zero only if s < v (bq) ; and from
Theorem 1, this only occurs if the retailer chooses the lowest sale price (i.e., s = sl = vB, which
occurs when D < Dl). Hence, the expected surplus for the indi¤erent strategic consumer is
(v (bq)  vB) Pr (D < Dl and the consumer receives a unit) : (3)
With the lowest sale price there are both strategic and bargain hunting consumers vying to purchase
limited inventory. As a result, the probability the indi¤erent strategic consumer actually receives
a unit in the sale period, which we call the ll rate, is not a priori guaranteed to be 100%. Hence,
we must discuss how inventory is allocated when demand exceeds supply in the salvage period.
We introduce a new parameter  2 [0; 1] which represents the level of optimism of the strategic
segment. Suppose demand in the second period forms a queue composed of both strategic and
bargain hunting consumers, of which only the rst I customers are served. Strategic consumers
represent every 1=th customer in the queue until there are no more strategic consumers and all
remaining consumers are bargain hunters (i.e., strategic consumers are uniformly distributed among
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the rst (1  )D= customers in the queue).11 If  = 1, then all the strategic consumers are at the
front of the queue (this is the assumption made in Su and Zhang 2005). If  = 0, then all strategic
consumers are at the end of the queue; since there are an innite number of bargain hunters, this
implies strategic consumers are never served.
As a result of this supply allocation mechanism, the e¤ective inventory available to strategic
consumers in the sale period is I, and the probability term in (3) is the second period ll rate
conditional on D < Dl. The rst part of the following lemma provides the precise value of this
term.
Lemma 4 (i) Dene c = sl=sm and let D = q= (1   + ). Assume consumersexpectation of
the rms quantity is correct, q^ = q; and the rms expectation of the indi¤erent strategic consumer
is correct, v^ = v(q^): Then, the probability the indi¤erent strategic consumer purchases and receives
a unit in the sale period is
F (Dl) if c  ;
F (D) +
R Dl
D
I
(1 )xdF (x) otherwise.
(ii) The consumer best response v (bq) satises limbq!0 v(bq) = v and limbq!1 v(bq) = v.
Lemma 4 demonstrates that if consumers are su¢ ciently optimistic (i.e., if  is not too small),
then  is irrelevant: in that situation the consumer expects to receive a unit conditional that
the lowest sale price is chosen, i.e., there is no rationing risk. To emphasize this point further,
all strategic consumers anticipate that they will be able to obtain a unit in period 2 when they
most desire a unit (i.e., when there is a deep discount and surplus is greatest), and the indi¤erent
strategic consumer receives a unit whenever she is willing to purchase at the markdown price. For
simplicity, we assume c   for the remainder of our analysis. (Our results qualitatively hold even
with c > ; but the analysis is more complex and the impact of strategic behavior is lessenedif
strategic consumers expect to have a low ll rate in the sale period, then they are more likely to
purchase in the rst period, thereby acting more like myopic consumers.)
11Suppose customers arrive with a Poisson process and 1= is the probability a customer is a strategic customer until
all strategic customers are accounted for. As customers are atomistic, this process will resemble ours. See Lariviere
and Van Mieghem (2004) for an analysis of how strategic customer behavior might lead to an arrival process that
resembles a Poisson process
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The second part of Lemma 4 shows that, as might be expected, if the retailer chooses a very
low initial inventory, all strategic consumers purchase in the rst period. If the retailer chooses a
very high initial inventory, all strategic consumers wait for the sale. These results are useful for
demonstrating the existence of an equilibrium.
We now note the crucial role of the bargain hunting segment. Suppose there were no bargain
hunting consumers but there continues to exist a strategic consumer with period 2 value v (bq)
who is indi¤erent between purchasing in either period. Because there are no bargain hunters,
all consumers in period 2 are strategic and have value v (bq) or higher (as per Lemma 1). The
retailers optimal period 2 price is then never less than v (bq) : It follows that the indi¤erent strategic
consumers period 2 surplus is zero, which means that consumer strictly prefers to purchase in period
1. Thus, we have established a contradictionthere cannot be an indi¤erent strategic consumer.
Hence, without the possibility of a deep discount created by bargain hunters, all strategic consumers
rationally purchase in period 1, i.e., they always behave as if they are myopic.
6 The Rational Expectations Equilibrium
We are now prepared to demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium. In addition, we derive a
result comparing the equilibrium order quantity with strategic consumers ( > 0) to the optimal
order quantity without strategic consumers ( = 0). In what follows, the superscript m signies
optimal values when all consumers are myopic ( = 0).
Theorem 1 A rational expectations equilibrium (q; v) to the game between the retailer and strate-
gic consumers exists, and any RE equilibrium satises q  qm and   m.
Proof. (i) Existence. A rational expectations equilibrium (q; v) to the game between a retailer
and strategic consumers exists if: (1)  (q; bv) is quasi-concave in q, and (2) a solution to
@ (q; bv)
@q
bv=v(q) = 0 (4)
exists. Note that from Lemma 4, limq!0 v(q) = v, and given v(q);
lim
q!0
Dl = lim
q!0
Dm = lim
q!0
Dh = 0:
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Similarly, limq!1 v(q) = v, and
lim
q!1Dl = limq!1Dm = limq!1Dh =1:
The expression for the high sale price, sh (D), satises limq!1 jsh (D)j <1 and limq!0 jsh (D)j <
1. By taking the limits of the rst order condition evaluated at bv = v (q), we then see that
lim
q!0
@ (q; bv)
@q
bv=v(q) = p  c > 0 and limq!1 @ (q; bv)@q
bv=v(q) = sl   c < 0:
By the continuity of @(q;bv)@q
bv=v(q), a solution to (4) must exist, hence, combined with the results
of Lemmas 2 and 3, an equilibrium must exist.
(ii) Equilibrium Comparison. Let m (q) be the retailers prot function with purely myopic
consumers (i.e., with  = 0). This is equivalent to the typical newsvendor model with salvage at
price sl, which yields:
@m (q)
@q
= p  c  pF (q) + slF (q) = 0;
It follows that
@m (q)
@q
  @ (q; bv)
@q
= p (F (Dh)  F (q)) + sl (F (q)  F (Dl)) +
Z Dh
Dm
(2sh (x)  v) dF (x): (5)
Because sh (x)  v=2, each term in (5) is positive. Therefore, for any bv the optimal myopic order
quantity is (weakly) greater than the optimal order quantity with strategic consumers and the
optimal prots exhibit the same relationship. The result also holds for any equilibrium belief.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the retailer orders less with strategic consumers than with my-
opic consumers; by lowering its initial inventory, the retailer raises the expected period 2 price
(markdowns become less generous), which induces some strategic consumers to purchase at the full
price. Others have also found that the presence of strategic consumers causes a rm to lower its
order quantity (e.g., Su and Zhang 2005 and Liu and Van Ryzin 2005). However, the mechanism
by which this result is obtained is di¤erent: they depend on rationing risk, whereas in our model
the result is due to price riskstrategic consumers expect they will receive a unit in the markdown
period, but they do not know what the price will be.
17
Period 1 Period 2
Retailer
determines
the initial
stocking level.
Retailer sets
the sale
price.
Bargain hunting
consumers and any
strategic consumers
who waited purchase.
Excess
inventory
salvaged
for zero.
As the selling season approaches, demand
uncertainty is resolved, and the retailer
makes a second procurement.
Myopic and strategic consumers visit
the retailer, and strategic consumers
choose to purchase now or wait for
the sale.
Figure 5. Sequence of events with quick response.
We also note that while Theorem 1 proves the existence of an equilibrium, multiple equilibria to
the game can exist. However, in our numerical analysis (discussed in section 8) we found multiple
equilibria in only 2.5% of our sample (21 instances out of 840 cases). Thus, while multiple equilibria
may occur, it appears that such cases are rare.
7 The Value of Quick Response
In this section we analyze a retailer with quick response capabilities, and explore precisely how
strategic consumer behavior a¤ects the value of a quick response system. To model quick response,
we modify the base model described in §3 by allowing the retailer to submit and receive an additional
order at the start of the rst period after observing demand, D. The original order before the selling
season remains (i.e., before observing demandD) and those units cost the retailer c1 per unit. Units
procured in the second order cost c2 per unit, where p  c2  c1, and they are received prior to any
potential stockout (i.e., all demand in the rst period is served).12 With purely myopic consumers,
this model is equivalent to the quick response with reactive capacity model in Cachon and Terwiesch
(2005). As such, we use the subscript r to denote reactive capacitywhere relevant. Figure 5
depicts the new sequence of events.
Our rst result mirrors Lemma 2 by providing the form of the optimal second period pricing
12The results remain qualitatively unchanged if excess rst period demand is lost prior to receiving a replenishment
via quick response. In case quick response does not help with matching supply with demand in period 1, but it does
reduce the expected price in period 2. Consequently, with quick response the rm orders less and more strategic
consumers decide to purchase in period 1. Furthermore, our results extend to the case of an imperfect demand
signal. When the demand signal is pure noise, quick response provides no value and that model is identical to our
original model without quick response.
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policy with quick response.
Lemma 5 Assume the retailer has quick response capabilities. (i) Let sr = argmaxsbv(s c2)G (s)
and let Dr = q=
 
 +G (sr)

. Then, if c2  v, given a demand level D, there is a unique optimal
sale price determined by
s =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
sr if Dr < D
sh (D) if Dm < D  Dr
sm if Dl < D  Dm
sl if D  Dl
:
where Dl, Dm, sl; sm, and sh(D) are as in Lemma 2, and Dr  Dh from Theorem 1. If c2 > v,
then reactive capacity is never used to satisfy sale period demand, and the optimal sale price is
identical to that derived in Lemma 2.
(ii) The retailers prot with quick response, r (q; bv) ; is quasi-concave in q.
Like in the model with without quick response, the retailer o¤ers a deep discount; sl; only when
demand is su¢ ciently low, D  Dl: With slightly higher demand, inventory is su¢ ciently restrictive
that the retailer chooses the revenue maximizing price, sm; leaving some units unsold. If demand is
yet higher, the retailer chooses a price to clear inventory. However, the retailer never prices higher
than sr; which is the optimal price when the marginal unit is procured at c2
As a consequence of Lemma 5, the consumer best response function is identical with and without
quick response. The consumer best response depends only on the probability of a low sale price
(sl), and this probability is the same for a given q with and without quick response: if the
retailers optimal action is to o¤er a deep discount to clear excess inventory, then quick response
is clearly of no use to the retailer. (While the addition of quick response does not change v(bq),
the equilibrium in general does change.) In other words, the ability of the retailer to obtain
an inventory replenishment after learning demand information does not alter consumer behavior
because that capability is only put to use when demand is high and the discount in the sale period
is relatively small. This is a robust result because it is never protable to both procure additional
inventory and serve the lowest value segment.
Analogous to Theorem 1, an equilibrium exists in the quick response game.13 Furthermore,
13 It is important to note here that multiple equilibria may also exist in this game, just as in the game without
quick response; however, in 840 numerical examples with quick response, we found no instance of multiple equilibria.
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quick response induces the retailer to lower its initial stocking level and the retailer earns a higher
prot with quick response than without.
Theorem 2 A rational expectations equilibrium (qr ; vr ) to the game between the retailer with quick
response and strategic consumers exists, yielding equilibrium expected prot r and satisfying qr 
q and r  . Furthermore, if
vM   p
v   vB 
c2   c1
c2   vB ; (6)
then in equilibrium all strategic consumers purchase in the rst period.
Proof. (i) Existence. The proof is identical to Theorem 1. (ii) Equilibrium Comparison. We
note that the model without quick response is equivalent to the model with quick response, with
c2 = p. By analyzing how equilibrium quantities and prots change as a function of c2, we may
derive the results. There are subsequently three cases: either c2  v and sr = (v + c2) =2 or
sr 6= (v + c2) =2, or c2 > v. By substituting the optimal sale period pricing policy from Lemma 5
into the retailers prot function and taking partial derivatives, we have, for the sr 6= (v + c2) =2
case or the c2 > v case,
@r
@c2
=
Z 1
Dh
(q   x) dF (x)  0 and @
2r
@q@c2
= F (Dh)  0:
If sr = (v + c2) =2, then
@r
@c2
=
Z 1
Dr
 
q     +G (sr)x dF (x)  0 and @2r
@q@c2
= F (Dr)  0:
From the Implicit Function Theorem and the fact that the indi¤erent consumers surplus (and
hence the consumer best response) contains no explicit dependence on c2,
@qr
@c2
=   @
2r
@q@c2

@2r
@q2
 0:
Thus, it follows that qr is greatest when c2 is largest, i.e., when c2 = p and there is e¤ectively no
quick response option. From the Envelope Theorem,
dr
dc2
=
@r
@c2
+
@r
@q
@qr
@c2
=
@r
@c2
 0:
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Hence, equilibrium prots are smallest when c2 = p, i.e., when there is no quick response (iii) All
Consumers Purchasing Early. If all strategic consumers purchase in the rst period in equilibrium,
then the equilibrium stocking level must be the myopic optimal with quick response, qmr , and the
consumer best response must be equal to v. To see when v (qmr ) = v, we note that this occurs
when all consumers have an incentive to purchase in the rst period, i.e. when
vM   p  F (qmr ) (v   vB) :
Since qmr = F
 1

c2 c1
c2 vB

, this condition reduces to (6).
The nal result in Theorem 2 provides a condition for when quick response induces all strategic
consumers to purchase at the full price. In these cases quick response enables the retailer to
restrict its initial stocking quantity to a point that e¤ectively eliminates strategic behavior: given
the retailers low initial inventory, a strategic consumer expects only a very small probability the
retailer will o¤er a deep discount in the second period, and thus the consumer is better o¤ buying
at the full price in period 1.14
The next theorem provides a su¢ cient condition for when quick response is more valuable to
a retailer that has strategic customers than to a retailer that has only myopic consumers. As we
demonstrate in section 8, this condition is by no means necessary.
Theorem 3 If (6) holds, the value of quick response, given by  = r   , is greater if some
consumers are strategic than if all consumers are myopic.
Proof. Let m = mr   m be the value of quick response with purely myopic consumers ( = 0).
If (6) holds, since all consumers purchase in the rst period with quick response, r = mr , and
hence
 m = (r   )  (mr   m) = m     0;
where the inequality follows from Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 is concerned with the absolute increase in prot due to quick response. An im-
mediate consequence of the theorem combined with the result of Theorem 1 is that the relative
14This result emphasizes that strategic consumers may exist in a market even if their behavior in equilibrium
mirrors the behavior of myopic consumers. If the retailer were to increase its quantity (possibly based on the
incorrect conjecture that the lack of strategic behavior implies a lack of strategic consumers) then the retailer may
start to observe explicit strategic behavior.
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(percentage) increase in prot is also greater with strategic consumers than with myopic consumers.
Corollary 1 If (6) holds, the percentage increase in prot due to quick response, given by = =
(r   ) =, is greater if some consumers are strategic than if all consumers are myopic.
With myopic consumers it is well known that quick response allows the retailer to better match
its supply to its exogenous demand. Demand is endogenous with strategic consumers, so quick
response provides the additional benet of inuencing demand. In particular, quick response allows
the retailer to force strategic consumers to buy at the full price rather than wait for a possible
discount: the retailers optimal quick response quantity can be su¢ ciently low that all strategic
consumers purchase in the rst period because they expect that a deep discount is unlikely in the
second period. However, it should be noted that quick response is not always more valuable in the
presence of strategic consumers. Suppose strategic consumers purchase in the second period either
with or without quick response. Then there are (1   )D full price consumers with  > 0, but
D full price consumers when  = 0: In that case, quick response can be more valuable with myopic
consumers because the myopic consumer case has more full price demand. Nevertheless, as we
previously mentioned, in §8 we nd that quick response is more valuable with strategic consumers
in the vast majority of situations (i.e., condition (6) is merely su¢ cient for the results of Theorem
3 and Corollary 1).
It is interesting to compare quick response as a mechanism for inuencing consumer behavior
to strategies studied previously in the literature. For instance, Su and Zhang (2005), Liu and van
Ryzin (2005), and Su and Zhang (2007) discuss various ways of signaling low inventorythat is, of
credibly demonstrating limited availability. In our model, quick response does not reduce availabil-
ity; on the contrary, quick response manages to mitigate strategic purchasing while simultaneously
increasing availabilitywhen condition (6) holds, the entire strategic segment is always served when
the rm operates with quick response but may be rationed without it. As previously mentioned,
the e¤ectiveness of quick response derives from the reduced likelihood of deep markdowns. A con-
sequence of these facts is that quick response has an ambiguous e¤ect on total consumer welfare:
more strategic (and myopic) consumers are served with quick response (when condition (6) holds,
100% of these consumers are served), but at a higher price than if the retailer operated without
quick response and was likely to discount heavily.
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8 Discussion
In this section we report on a numerical study that investigates the magnitude of the analytical
results presented in the previous sections. Furthermore, we present results regarding the value of
dynamic pricing versus committing to a price path and we investigate the consequence of assuming
all consumers are myopic when in fact a portion of them are strategic.
We rst constructed 1,920 examples using all combinations of the parameters in Table 6. In
1,080 out of 1,920 cases (56.25% of the initial sample) the following condition holds: vM   p 
(v   vB)F (qm), where qm is the myopic optimal quantity. In those examples, the myopic and
strategic models yield identical equilibria (with or without quick response) because all strategic
consumers prefer to purchase at the full price even at the myopic optimal quantity, qm. Conse-
quently, it is not interesting to compare the myopic and strategic cases. Thus, we discarded those
examples and restrict our attention to the remaining 840 instances in which strategic behavior
occurs in equilibrium. For each of those examples we found all equilibria both with and without
quick response.
Parameter Values
Demand Distribution Gamma
μ 100
σ {25, 50, 100, 150}
p 10
c1 {2.5, 5, 7.5}
c2 {c1 + 1, c1 + 2}
vM {12, 15}
vB {1, 2}
V { [2, 10], [3, 4], [6, 7], [9, 10] }
α {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}
Table 6. Parameter values used in numerical experiments. V = [v; v] is the interval of strategic consumer
values.
Table 7 presents data on the value of quick response with strategic consumers relative to the
case without strategic consumers. Condition (6) holds in 38.1% of the 840 examples in the sample.
Hence, in those examples Theorem 3 indicates that quick response is more valuable with strategic
consumers. Among the remaining 520 examples, we nd that quick response is less valuable with
strategic consumers in only 11 cases. Overall, quick response is more valuable with strategic
consumers than with myopic consumers in 98.7% of the 840 examples. Furthermore, the table
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reveals that the magnitude of the di¤erence in value between the myopic and strategic cases can
be signicant. As previous work on quick response with myopic consumers has shown, the prot
increase due to quick response can be enormous, quadrupling prots in some cases. We nd
that with strategic consumers, the potential prot increase can be far greater. In fact, if all
consumers are strategic, then quick response is on average 67% more valuable than with purely
myopic consumers, and can be over ve times more valuable. Consequently, a signicant portion
of the value of quick response may lie in the ability of quick response to mitigate the negative
consequences of strategic consumers.
Maximum Value
σ/μ c2-c1 α = 0.25 α = 0.50 α = 0.75 α = 1.00 of Δ/Δm
0.25 2 2.08 2.07 2.05 2.02 5.58
1 1.96 1.94 1.92 1.91 5.27
0.50 2 1.74 1.87 1.88 1.89 4.71
1 1.72 1.80 1.79 1.79 4.50
1.00 2 1.24 1.42 1.52 1.59 3.74
1 1.29 1.46 1.54 1.59 3.51
1.50 2 1.08 1.13 1.19 1.26 2.04
1 1.12 1.21 1.29 1.36 2.88
1.53 1.61 1.65 1.67 5.58
Parameters Mean Value of QR Relative to Myopic Case (Δ/Δm)
All
Table 7. The value of quick response (QR) with strategic consumers, ; relative to the value of quick
response with myopic consumers, m.
The largest entry in Table 7 occurs when the cost of quick response is high (i.e., when c2   c1
is large) and demand variability is low (on average 2.08 times more valuable). In those scenarios
quick response does not add much value as a means of reacting to updated forecast information,
but it does add signicant value by inducing strategic consumers to purchase at the full price.
We have generally observed that the value of quick response is roughly concave in  (though it
need not be monotonic). Figure 8 provides an example; for small , the value of quick is response
is rapidly increasing in , while for any  greater than 0.3, the value is relatively at. The
consequence is that a small number of strategic consumers in the population is enough to produce
a rather large impact on the retailers decisions and the value of quick response. In our sample of
840 examples, an average of 88% of the maximum potential prot increase due to quick response
is captured when  = 0:25.
So far we have assumed the retailer correctly anticipates the presence of strategic consumers.
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Figure 8. The value of quick response (expressed both in absolute prot increase and percentage prot
increase) as a function of , with p = 10, c1 = 2:5, c2 = 3:5; vM = 12, vB = 2, [v; v] 2 [6; 7], and demand
gamma distributed with mean 100 and standard deviation 50.
However, it is interesting to measure the reduction in the retailers prot if it were to make decisions
assuming all consumers are myopic when in fact they are strategic. Table 9 provides data on the
cost of failing to recognize strategic behavior both with and without quick response. If the rm
does not have quick response capabilities and there is indeed a large number of strategic consumers,
ignoring their strategic behavior can lead to a prot loss of over 90%. However, the consequence of
failing to recognize strategic behavior is smaller for a quick response rm. A quick response rm is
likely to be conservative with its initial order quantity even if it assumes all consumers are myopic.
As a result, the quick response rm su¤ers less from this type of error. For example, if condition
(6) holds, then the quick response retailer does not su¤er at all from assuming all consumers are
myopic because all of the strategic consumers act as if they are myopic at the retailers chosen order
quantity.
We next consider when a static pricing policy is favored over a subgame perfect, dynamic pricing
policy, again, both with and without quick response. Recall, Aviv and Pazgal (2005) nd that
static pricing may be preferred over dynamic pricing and Liu and van Ryzin (2005) assume the
retailer commits to a static pricing policy. In our model, if the retailer chooses to commit to any
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Mean % Cost of Ignoring Max % Cost of Ignoring Mean % Cost of Ignoring Max % Cost of Ignoring
Strategic Behavior Strategic Behavior Strategic Behavior Strategic Behavior
0.25 2.46% 10.84% 1.08% 11.71%
0.50 6.41% 32.07% 2.80% 28.47%
0.75 10.87% 64.37% 3.73% 42.56%
1.00 15.87% 90.51% 6.66% 60.23%
α
Without Quick Response With Quick Response
Table 9. The average and maximum prot loss incurred when ignoring strategic behavior (cases with
multiple equilibria excluded).
% of Examples with Profitable Mean % Max % Mean % Min %
Sale Price Commitment Profit Increase Profit Increase Profit Decrease Profit Decrease
0.25 4.17% 2.39% 5.24% -11.38% -48.10%
0.50 6.77% 4.30% 11.06% -9.49% -45.21%
0.75 7.81% 7.74% 38.55% -8.31% -43.02%
1.00 7.29% 16.35% 93.62% -7.50% -41.43%
0.25 21.43% 3.73% 15.70% -1.72% -8.12%
0.50 20.83% 6.36% 42.00% -1.70% -7.87%
0.75 19.64% 7.99% 62.03% -1.68% -7.87%
1.00 18.45% 8.89% 64.96% -1.68% -8.05%
α
No QR
QR
Table 10. The frequency and protability of sale price commitment when the rm does not have quick
response (No QR) or does have quick response (QR). Prot increase is calculated conditional on price
commitment being protable and the Prot decrease is calculated conditional on price commitment being
unprotable.
particular sale price (and is able to credibly signal such commitment), then the optimal action is to
choose to not markdown at all.15 As a result, all strategic consumers purchase in the rst period,
and no bargain hunters purchase in period two. Hence, price commitment is benecial in that
it shifts strategic demand to the full price period, but it is costly in that the retailer forgoes the
opportunity to salvage inventory. Whether or not static pricing is a prudent strategy depends on
the relative importance of those two e¤ects.
Lets rst consider the case in which the retailer operates without quick response. According to
Table 10, static pricing can be substantially more protable than dynamic pricing, but it is better
than dynamic pricing in fewer than 8% of cases. Table 11 presents another view of the data: sorted
by the six di¤erent newsvendor critical ratios (i.e., (p   c)=(p   sl)) used in our sample. As this
table shows, committing to a high sale price is only protable when the critical ratio is very high
15Committing to a sale price of sl results in the largest number of consumers waiting for the sale, in addition to the
lowest average price in the sale period, so a dynamic pricing policy is clearly preferred. Conditional on committing
to any price greater than sl, the optimal action is to price as high as possible, which induces all strategic consumers
to purchase in the rst period.
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% of Examples with Profitable % of Examples with Profitable
Sale Price Commitment Sale Price Commitment
0.2778 0.00% <0.3333 0.00%
0.3125 0.00% 0.3333 15.00%
0.5556 0.00% 0.4000 16.11%
0.6250 0.00% 0.5714 25.00%
0.8333 17.50% 0.6666 32.00%
0.9375 13.75% 0.8000 35.00%
Critical Ratio Critical Ratio
Without Quick Response With Quick Response
Table 11. Frequency of protable sale price commitment as a function of the newsvendor critical ratio:
(p  c)=(p  sl) in the cases without quick response, and (c2  c1)=(c2  sl) in the cases with quick response.
(greater than 0.8333). In these cases, margins in the rst period are large and the cost of left over
inventory is low. Hence, there can be considerable value in inducing all strategic consumers to
purchase at the full price.
If the retailer has quick response capabilities, then Table 10 reports a more favorable situation
for static pricing: static pricing is more protable than dynamic pricing in approximately 20% of
the scenarios and can be as much as 65% more protable. Committing to a price path is costly
when there is likely to be a substantial amount of inventory left over at the end of the full price
period. Quick response lowers the amount of left over inventory, so commitment is less costly.
However, the benet of commitment remains: it induces strategic consumers to buy at the full
price.
Overall, despite the appeal of using static pricing to induce strategic consumers to purchase
at the full price, our model suggests that a rm is generally better o¤ using dynamic pricing even
if the rm could commit to a static pricing policy. However, there are situations in which static
pricing is benecial, especially if the rm has quick response capabilities.
9 Conclusion
Some consumers act strategically: they choose not only whether to buy a product but when to buy
the product. They time their purchase based on their expectations of the retailers markdown be-
havior as well as their own disutility from purchasing late in the season. In our model, the retailer
chooses an optimal inventory and pricing policy given his expectation of consumer behavior, and
each consumer chooses an optimal purchasing strategy given her expectation of the retailers behav-
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ior and the behavior of other consumers. We demonstrate that a rational expectations equilibrium
exists and we study its properties.
In our base model in which the retailer does not have quick response capabilities, we nd that
a retailer can incur a substantial loss in prot by ignoring strategic behaviorfailing to recognize
strategic behavior leads the rm to order too much inventory, which makes deep discounts to clear
inventory at the end of the season more likely. When consumers expect deep discounts, they are
more likely to be patient and wait for a sale. This error is generally less costly when the retailer
has quick response, but the prot loss can still be substantial.
Although retailers may dislike having to take markdowns, we nd that a commitment to never
markdown merchandise is generally not the best approach to deal with strategic consumers (even
if such a commitment could be made credibly), especially when the rm does not have quick
response capabilities. The better approach is to be prudent with the initial inventory and then to
dynamically and optimally discount.
Our main result is that quick response capabilities can be signicantly more valuable to a retailer
in the presence of strategic consumers relative to the case when consumers are not strategic. It has
already been established in the literature that quick response can be quite valuable when consumers
are myopic (i.e., non-strategic); our result indicates that even the known value of quick response
may underestimate its true value. With myopic consumers, quick response gives the retailer the
ability to use updated forecasts to better match supply with demand. With strategic consumers,
quick response also gives the retailer the ability to mitigate the negative consequences of strategic
behavior. In particular, quick response allows the retailer to manipulate its demand. Furthermore,
this latter benet can be substantial.
Our result with respect to quick response is important because a rm must make an investment
to develop quick response capabilities. For example, the fashion apparel retailer Zara invests in
localized production, fast delivery and information technology to exchange information across the
rm quickly. The results of these policies at Zara have been dramatic: Ghemawat and Nueno
(2003) report that Zara performs signicantly better than the competition in both the number and
severity of markdowns, with markdown percentages that are half the European average of 30%.
We show that investments in quick response, like those made by Zara, are easier to justify when
strategic consumer behavior is fully accounted for.
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The following technical appendix is composed of four sections. The rst contains the proofs
of all Lemmas from the paper. The second section discusses the monotone scaled likelihood ratio
(MSLR) assumption that is used in the main text. The third section considers an extension in
which the retailer sets the rst period (full) price. The fourth section considers an extension in
which consumers do not know their second period value ex ante.
1 Proofs
Lemma 1 In a rational expectations equilibrium, there exists some v 2 [v; v] such that all strategic
consumers with second period value less than v purchase in the rst period, and all consumers
with value greater than v wait for the sale period. A consumer with value v is indi¤erent between
purchasing in the rst or second periods.
Proof. The surplus to a strategic consumer who purchases in the rst period is vM   p, which
is constant and independent of a consumers second period valuation. In the second period, a
strategic consumer only purchases the product if (1) the sale price is less than or equal to their
second period valuation, and (2) there is inventory available to purchase. Let
R x
0 h (s; bv; bq) ds be
a strategic consumers belief of the probability that the sale price is less than or equal to x and
the consumer receives a unit. Then second period expected surplus of a strategic consumer with
period 2 valuation equal to v is
 (v; bv; bq) = Z v
0
(v   s)h (s; bv; bq) ds:
Since h () is independent of v due to the rational expectations hypothesis, this expression is in-
creasing in v, and hence there is a unique v for which vM   p =  (v; bv; bq). All consumers with
greater valuations prefer to wait for the sale, while all consumers with lower valuations prefer to
purchase at the full price.
Lemma 2 Dene the critical demand levels Dl = q=
 
 + smG (sm)=sl

, Dm = q=
 
 +G (sm)

,
and Dh = q=, where l;m; and h stand for low, medium, and high, respectively. Then given a
demand level D, there is a unique optimal sale price determined by
s(D) =
8<:
sh (D) if Dm < D  Dh
sm if Dl < D  Dm
sl if D  Dl
;
1
where sl = vB is the low sale price, sm = argmaxsbv s (v   s) is the medium sale price, and sh (D) =
(v   v) (D   q) =D + bv is the high sale price, which is contingent on the demand realization and
remaining inventory.
Proof. First, we note that in order for the retailer to have inventory to sell in the second period,
we require D  Dh. The retailer then has two choices:
(i) Pricing to serve only strategic consumers ( s > vB). Any price in the range bv > s > vB is
never optimal (s = bv always yields greater prot). The optimal price conditional on s  bv is the
solution to
argmax
sbv
 
smin
 
G (s)D; I

:
If D  q, then the retailer is demand constrained even if he serves all strategic consumers. That
is, if D  q, then min  G (s)D; I = G (s)D for all s  bv. The retailers optimization problem
then becomes
sm = argmax
sbv

s
v   s
v   vD

:
Since s (v   s) is concave, there may be an interior optimum determined by the solution to the rst
order condition, which yields s = v=2, if s  bv; otherwise, the optimal price is on the boundary.
Note that the optimal price is independent of D and , but does depend on bv and v. The optimal
prot in this region is smv smv v D.
Now consider the case in which q < D  Dh. In this region, if the retailer sets a low sale price,
he is inventory constrained, whereas if he sets a high sale price, he is demand constrained. For any
demand level D, there exists some critical price sh (D), such that the retailers revenue function is
R (s; I) =

sI if s  sh (D)
sG (s)D otherwise
:
In particular, sh (D) is determined by solving I = G (s)D for s, which yields
sh (D) = (v   v) D   q
D
+ bv:
Recall that sm is the maximizer of sG (s)D. Because sG (s) is concave, if sh (D)  sm, the
optimal sale price is sm, whereas if sh (D) > sm, the optimal sale price is sh (D). Thus, there
exists some critical demand level Dm such that for D < Dm, it is optimal to price at sm, and for
D > Dm, it is optimal to price at sh (D). Dm is determined by solving sh (D) = sm for D, which
yields
Dm =
q
 +G (sm)
:
(ii) Pricing to serve the bargain hunting segment ( s = vB). If the retailer sets s = sl, second
period revenue is slI. This yields a greater prot than pricing at sm if and only if
D  slq
smG (sm)+ sl
 Dl:
Since sm maximizes s (v   s) in the interval v  s  bv  sl,
slG (bv)  bvG (bv)  smG (sm) ;
which implies Dl  q. Thus, if demand is less than Dl, it is optimal to price low to clear all
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inventory (s = sl) and serve the bargain hunters.
Lemma 3 The retailers prot  (q; bv) is quasi-concave in q, and the optimal order quantity is
determined by the unique solution to the rst order condition,
d (q; bv)
dq
= p  c  pF (Dh) + slF (Dl) +
Z Dh
Dm
(2sh (x)  v) dF (x) = 0: (1)
Proof. The retailers expected prot under the optimal salvage pricing policy is
 (q; bv) = pZ Dh
0
xdF (x) + p
Z 1
Dh
qdF (x)  cq + sl
Z Dl
0
(q   x) dF (x)
+ sm
Z Dm
Dl
G (sm)xdF (x) +
Z Dh
Dm
sh (x) (q   x) dF (x):
Di¤erentiation of this expression yields
d (q; bv)
dq
= p  c  pF (Dh) + slF (Dl) +
Z Dh
Dm

sh (x) +
dsh (x)
dq
(q   x)

dF (x):
Taking the derivative of sh (x) with respect to q, we have dsh (x) =dq =   (v   v) =x. Then,
the rst derivative reduces to (1). Let ' (q) = d (q; bv) =dq. Noting ' (0) = p   c > 0 and
limq!1 ' (q) =  c+ sl < 0, it is apparent that  (q; bv) possesses at least one local maximum. To
demonstrate quasi-concavity of  (q; bv), we must show that ' (q) has a unique zero, i.e., that  (q; bv)
possesses a single local optimum. Given the asymptotic behavior of ' (q), a su¢ cient condition for
this to occur is that ' (q) itself possesses at most one local optimum. If this is the case, then ' (q) is
either quasi-concave or quasi-convex, and '0 (q) will possess at most one interior zero. Substituting
for sh (x), '0 (q) = d2 (q; bv) =dq2 is given by
'0 (q) = (v   p) f (Dh) dDh
dq
+ slf (Dl)
dDl
dq
  (2sm   v) f (Dm) dDm
dq
  2 (v   v)
Z Dh
Dm
1
x
dF (x);
A local optimum is achieved ('0 (q) = 0) if and only if, for any q on the interior of the support of
f ,
0 = (v   p) f (Dh)
f (Dm)
dDh
dq
+ sl
f (Dl)
f (Dm)
dDl
dq
  (2sm   v) dDm
dq
(2)
  2 (v   v) 1
f (Dm)
Z Dh
Dm
1
x
dF (x):
Recall that the MSLR assumption implies f (x) =f (x) is monotonic in x for all   1. Assume
that f (x) =f (x) is weakly increasing in x. (The proof is identical if f (x) =f (x) is weakly
decreasing in x.) Since v  p, the rst term is negative and increasing in q by MSLR assumption.
Similarly, the second term is positive and increasing in q by the MSLR assumption. The third
term is constant, while the fourth term is negative. We will now demonstrate that the fourth term
is also increasing in q by performing a change of variable. Let yq = x, such that dx = qdy, and let
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h = dDh=dq and m = dDm=dq. Then, the integral in the fourth term is equivalent toZ Dh
Dm
f (x)
xf (Dm)
dx =
Z h
m
f (yq)
yf (mq)
dy:
Di¤erentiating with respect to q,
d
dq
Z h
m
f (yq)
yf (mq)
dy

=
Z h
m
dy
y

d
dq
f (yq)
f (mq)

 0;
where the inequality follows from the MSLR assumption combined with the fact that y  m.
Thus it follows that the fourth term in (2) is increasing in q. Each term on the right hand side of
(2) is increasing in q, and if a solution to the equation exists, it is unique. This implies ' (q) has
at most one interior optimum, and consequently  (q; bv) is quasi-concave in q.
Lemma 4 (i) Dene c = sl=sm and let D = q= (1   + ). The probability an indi¤erent
strategic consumer purchases and receives a unit in the sale period is
F (Dl) if c  ;
F (D) +
R Dl
D
I
(1 )xdF (x) otherwise.
(ii) The consumer best response v (bq) satises limbq!0 v(bq) = v and limbq!1 v(bq) = v.
Proof. (i) The probability that D < Dl and a strategic consumer receives a unit isZ Dl
0
min ((1  )x; I)
(1  )x dF (x) :
A new critical demand level D is determined by the min ((1  )D; I) term,
(1  )D =  (q   D) :
If D < D, all strategic consumers are served in the sale period. In particular, if Dl  D, then
the sale price is only low when all strategic consumers are served. By comparing Dl and D, we
see that this occurs when sl=sm  .
(ii) Note that limbq!0Dl = limbq!0D = 0. Thus, the probability term in (??) goes to zero
as bq approaches zero. Consequently, any strategic consumers purchasing in the second period
will receive zero surplus (in expectation), while purchase in the rst period will yield a strictly
positive surplus. Hence, all consumers purchase in the rst period, and limbq!0 v(bq) = v. Sim-
ilarly, limbq!1Dl = limbq!1D = 1, which implies the probability term in (??) goes to one asbq approaches innity. This implies all strategic consumers purchase the product at the lowest
sale price in period 2, and hence, since vM   p < v   vB by assumption, there are no indi¤erent
consumers and all strategic type consumers wait for the sale.
Lemma 5 Assume the retailer has quick response capabilities. (i) Let sr = argmaxsbv(s c2)G (s)
and let Dr = q=
 
 +G (sr)

. Then, if c2  v, given a demand level D, there is a unique optimal
sale price determined by
s =
8>><>>:
sr if Dr < D
sh (D) if Dm < D  Dr
sm if Dl < D  Dm
sl if D  Dl
:
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where Dl, Dm, sl; sm, and sh(D) are as in Lemma 2, and Dr  Dh from Theorem 1. If c2 > v,
then reactive capacity is never used to satisfy sale period demand, and the optimal sale price is
identical to that derived in Lemma 2.
(ii) The retailers prot with quick response, r (q; bv) ; is quasi-concave in q.
Proof. (i) We rst note that the retailer may e¤ectively make the sale price and second procurement
decisions simultaneously (although the sale price is not enacted until the start of the second period).
The retailer will always procure at least enough inventory to fulll all rst period demand. Let
q2 be the additional inventory procured above the total rst period demand. Note that if c2 > v,
then q2 = 0 and the retailers sale price decision is identical to the model without quick response;
hence we need only analyze the case where c2  v. Then the retailers prot function is
r (q; bv) = E pD   c2 (D   q)+   c1q + max
sp;q20
R (s; I; q2)

;
where I = (q   D)+. There are consequently two cases: if I = 0, then the initial inventory
procurement is insu¢ cient to ll any demand in the sale period. Hence, the retailer will likely
wish to procure additional inventory specically for sale in the salvage period. Alternatively, if
I > 0, then some inventory from the initial order remains for the sale period. We will treat each
case separately.
(1) I = 0. Any unit sold must be procured through quick response, thus q2 = G (s)D. Thus,
the retailers margin on each unit sold is (s c2), and second period revenue as a function solely of s
is R (s) = (s c2)G (s)D, for s  bv. The optimal sale price is thus sr = argmaxs2[bv;v](s c2)G (s),
and is equal to (v + c2) =2 if this value is interior to the interval [bv; v].
(2) I > 0. In this case, all rst period demand was satised without the need to procure
additional inventory, and the retailer will have positive on-hand inventory at the start of the second
period even if no replenishment is made. The second period revenue is
R (s; I; q2) =

smin
 
G (s)D; I + q2
  c2q2 if s  bv
sI if s  vB :
If D < q, then the retailer is never inventory constrained in the second period, hence the revenue
function is a identical to that derived in Theorem 1, and the optimal pricing scheme is also identical.
On the other hand, if D > q, then demand exceeds the total supply, and the retailer may wish to
procure additional units. Pricing to serve the bargain hunting segment is never optimal, and q2 = 
G (s)D   I+, hence the second period revenue as a function of s is
R (s; I) = sG (s)D   c2
 
G (s)D   I+ : (3)
Note that additional inventory is required (
 
G (s)D   I+ > 0) if
s  (v   v) D   q
D
+ bv = sh (D) :
Thus, (3) is equivalent to
R (s; I) =

sG (s)D if v  s  sh (D)
(s  c2)G (s)D + c2I if sh (D) > s  bv :
This expression is a piecewise denition of two constrained concave functions. The unconstrained
5
maximizers of these two functions are sm = max(v=2; bv) and sr (dened above), respectively. This
implies that if sm  sh (D), the optimal sale price is sm (just as in Theorem 1). If sm < sh (D),
the optimal sale price is min(sr; sh(D)). Thus, by nding the demand value for which sr = sh(D),
we may nd Dr, and the result follows.
(ii) The retailers expected prot under the optimal salvage pricing policy is
r (q; bv) = p+ c2 Z 1
Dr
(q   x) dF (x)  c1q + sl
Z Dl
0
(q   x) dF (x)
+ sm
Z Dm
Dl
G (sm)xdF (x) +
Z Dr
Dm
sh (x) (q   x) dF (x) +
Z 1
Dr
(sr   c2)G (sr)xdF (x):
Di¤erentiation of this expression yields
dr (q; bv)
dq
= c2   c1   c2F (Drh) + slF (Dl) +
Z Dr
Dm
(2sh (x)  v) dF (x) = 0: (4)
Let 'r (q) = dr (q; bv) =dq. Noting 'r (0) = c2   c1 > 0 and limq!1 'r (q) =  c1 + sl < 0, it is
apparent that r (q; bv) possesses at least one local maximum. In the same manner as Theorem 2,
by di¤erentiating (4) we may show that there is a unique solution to dr (q; bv) =dq = 0 and hence
the retailers prot function is quasi-concave in q. Noting that (4) is independent of p yields the
result.
2 Monotone Scaled Likelihood Ratio
Denition 2. A continuous, non-negative random variable X with density f satises the
monotone scaled likelihood ratio (MSLR) property if, for all   1 and x in the support
of X, f (x) =f (x) is monotonic in x.
Note that the property implies the following: f (bx) =f (ax) is monotonic in x, for all a  b  0.
The following table lists several non-negative distributions that satisfy this property. We use the
notation and conventions of Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), Tables 1 and 2.
Name Support Density f (x) Sign of d(f(x)=f(x))dx
Uniform [0; 1] 1 0
Exponential (0;1) e x +
Power (all c) (0; 1] cxc 1 0
Weibull (all c) [0;1) cxc 1e xc +
Gamma (all c) [0;1) xc 1e x (c) +
Chi-Squared (all c) [0;1) x(c 2)=2e x=2
2c=2 (c=2)
+
Chi (all c) [0;1) x(c 1)=2e x
2=2
2(c 2)=2 (c) +
Beta (!  1) [0; 1] x 1(1 x)! 1B(;!)  
Beta (!  1) [0; 1] x 1(1 x)! 1B(;!) +
While many of the above distributions are log-concave, it is not true that the MSLR property is
equivalent to log-concavity. For example, a normal distribution with a positive mean truncated to
the non-negative half-space is log-concave, but does not exhibit the MSLR property over the entire
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support. In addition, the MSLR property is satised by many distributions without log-concave
densities, such as the power, Weibull, gamma, chi, and chi-squared distributions for c < 1, and the
beta distribution with ! < 1. In general, if the distribution in question can be characterized by
scale and location parameters and satises monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property (see Karlin
and Rubin 1956), then the distribution satises the MSLR property.
3 Extension: Pricing in the First Period
In this extension, we allow the retailer to set the full price p in addition to the order quantity before
the start of the initial selling season. We are interested in the optimal price path with and without
strategic consumers. Consider the base model (i.e., there is no midseason replenishment opportu-
nity) and the following dynamics: the retailer chooses the rst period price p, then the retailer and
consumers simultaneously choose the inventory level and the purchase period, respectively. Thus,
the simultaneous game analyzed in §§46 of the main text is embedded in a Stackelberg game in
which the retailer acts as a leader in setting the price.1
To ensure that the only di¤erence between strategic and myopic consumers is their behavior, we
assume their valuations are identical across the segments. In particular, like strategic consumers,
myopic consumers have second period valuations uniformly distributed in the interval [v; v] and
return to the store in the second period if they do not purchase in the rst period. Hence, if the
retailer sets p > vM , all myopic demand is shifted to the sale period, whereas if p  vM ; myopic
demand occurs in the full price period.
Proposition 1 With strategic consumers and subgame perfect salvaging, the optimal rst period
price (p) is less than or equal to vM . With myopic consumers, the optimal rst period price (pm)
is vM .
Proof. For the case of strategic consumers, we argue by contradiction that p > vM cannot be
optimal for the retailer. With p > vM there is no demand in the rst period. If the retailer
sets p = vM , the worst case occurs if all strategic consumers purchase in the second period and all
myopic consumers in the rst. Because valuations decline over time, the retailer earns more per
unit on sales to myopic consumers in the rst than sales to myopic consumers in the second period.
Thus, p > vM cannot be optimal. With purely myopic consumers, the optimal rst period price
(pm) is clearly vM , because this is the largest price which induces the consumers to purchase in the
rst period.
Figure 1 demonstrates graphically how expected prices evolve. According to Proposition 1,
with myopic consumers prices uctuate between extremes; vM is optimal in the rst period, while
vB is optimal in the sale period. With strategic consumers the initial price is (weakly) lower than
vM ; to induce some strategic consumers to purchase in the rst period, and (weakly) greater than
vB in the second period, because there are second period consumers with valuations above vB:
Hence, prices are less volatile across time with strategic consumers, a result consistent with the
deterministic demand model studied by Besanko and Winston (1990).
4 Extenstion: Unknown Future Values
This section considers our model with one modication: now the strategics do not know their period
2 value for the product when they must make their buy/wait decision in period 1. The strategics
1 In e¤ect we are assuming that consumers immediately observe price whereas inventory is not immediately ob-
servable. Hence consumers react directly to the price set by the retailer.
7
Period 1 Period 2
Pr
ic
e
Pr
ic
e
Period 1 Period 2
(i) Myopic Consumers (ii) Strategic Consumers
vM
vB
Figure 1. The evolution of expected prices over time.
do learn their value for the product at the start of period 2 but the rm remains unaware of their
valuation when the period 2 pricing decision is made. Our objective is to demonstrate that quick
response can be more valuable in this model when there are strategic consumers relative to the case
in which there are only myopic consumers.
The notation with this model mimics our original notation, with some modication to account
for the unknown period 2 valuation: D = period 1 demand;  = fraction of period 1 demand that
is strategic; vM = value of strategics and myopics in period 1; v2  U [v; v] = value of strategics in
period 2; vB = value of bargain hunters in period 2; q = period 1 order quantity;  = fraction of
strategics that purchase in period 1;  = fraction of period 1 demand that purchases in period 1 =
(1  + ); I = inventory in period 2. We assume
vB  v < v  vM
v <
1
2
v < p
Because v < v=2; it may not be protable to try to sell to all of the strategics. The analysis with
v > v=2 is similar, but omitted for expositional brevity. Because v=2 < p; the rm never wants to
markup inventory in period 2 :
4.1 Period 2 pricing
Let s be the period 2 price. The rm can either take a deep discount to clear all inventory, s = vB;
or the rm can take a modest discount to sell to the strategics, s 2 [v; v]. Dene
R2(s;D2; I) =
(
s

v s
v v

min fD2; Ig v  s  v
vBI s = vB
where D2 = (1  )D and I = q  D + (1  )D so
min fD2; Ig =

(1  )D D < q
(q   (1  + )D)+ otherwise
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Dene
sH = argmax s

v   s
v   v

= v=2
sL = vB
So now we can write
R2(D; I; ) =
8><>:
v2
4(v v) (q  D + (1  )D)+ q < D  q1 (1 ) and s = sH
v2
4(v v)(1  )D D  q and s = sH
vB (q  D + (1  )D)+ s = vB
There are three situations describing R2; with the rst two being mutually exclusive. The rst
case is always preferred over the third because v=2 > v implies
v2
4 (v   v)  vB:
The second is preferred when there is a limited amount of inventory; in particular, the second is
preferred over the third when D > d^ where
d^ =
q
v2
4vB(v v)   1

(1  )+ 1
< q:
Note, if the rm takes a deep discount, then inventory exceeds demand from the strategics. We
assume that the strategics are the rst customers served, so they are guaranteed to receive a unit
in period 2. The period 2 revenue function can now be written as
R2(D;Q) =
8>>><>>>:
0 q1 (1 ) < D
v2
4(v v) (q   (1  (1  ))D) q < D  q1 (1 )
v2
4(v v)(1  )D d^ < D  q
vB (q   (1  (1  ))D) D  d^
4.2 Strategic consumersstrategy
The strategics need to form expectations about the second period price and availability. To
parallel our original model, the strategics assume they will be able to purchase a unit in period 2,
i.e., availability is not a direct concern for the strategics. Therefore, the stategics form expectations
about the second period price, which can be either sH or sL: Let  be the probability of a deep
discount,  = Pr(D  d^): The strategicsexpected surplus in period 2 is V :
V = 

v + v
2
  vB

+ (1  )

v   v=2
v   v

v + v=2
2
  v=2

:
the rst term is their expect surplus if a deep discount occurs. The second term above is their
surplus if s = sH , and it is composed of three terms: (1) the probability s = sH ; (2) the probability
the strategics are willing to purchase a unit at sH ; (3) their surplus conditional on being willing to
9
purchase a unit. Algebraic simplication of V yields:
V =
1
2

v2
4 (v   v) + 

3v2   4v2
4 (v   v)   2vB

:
It is straightforward to show that V is increasing in  given that vB  v  v=2:
Now consider the strategicsperiod 1 decision, which is either to purchase in period 1 at price
p or to wait until period 2 to make a purchase. Recall,  is the fraction of strategics that purchase
in period 1. If 0 <  < 1; then the strategics must be indi¤erent between purchasing in the two
periods:
vM   p = V
It is straightforward to determine that the strategics will be indi¤erent between the two periods
only if  is the probability of a deep discount in period 2, where
 =
2 (vM   p)  v24(v v)
3v2 4v2
4(v v)   2vB
 :
Note, this critical probability depends on the strategicsvaluations and the period 1 price, but not
on the strategicsperiod 1 decision.
Under what conditions is 0 <  < 1? The rst inequality holds when
v2
8 (v   v) < vM   p
and the second when
vM   p < 1
2

v2
4 (v   v) +

3v2   4v2
4 (v   v)   2vB

vM   p < 1
2
(v + v   2vB)
Taking vB  v and v < v=2; the above reduces to the following su¢ cient condition:
vM   p < v
4
:
Putting the two together, we have  2 (0; 1) when
v2
8 (v   v) < vM   p <
v
4
; (5)
which we will assume. (It is possible to show that this range is non-empty when v < v=2:) If the
above condition is violated, then the strategics either always purchase in period 1 (even if a deep
discount is guaranteed, the strategics prefer to purchase in period 1) or always purchase in period 2
(even if a deep discount is never o¤ered, the strategics prefer to purchase in period 2): in the former
the strategics act as if they are myopic and in the latter they act as if they are bargain hunters.
Therefore, without (5), we do not have a strategic segment and the model yields uninteresting
dynamics.
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Now dene ; which is the actual probability of a deep discount given  :
(q; ) = Pr

D  d^

= Pr
0@D  q
v2
4vB(v v)   1

(1  )+ 1
1A :
The strategics have three options, (1)  = 0; i.e., they all purchase in period 1; (2)  = 1; i.e.,
they all purchase in period 2 or (3) 0 <  < 1; i.e., they play a mixed strategy because they
are indi¤erent between purchasing in either period given that all other strategics are adopting the
same strategy. In the last case it must be that (q; ) = ; i.e., the stategicschoice, ; must
yield a probability of a deep discount that makes the strategics indi¤erent between the two periods.
Otherwise, one of the two other strategies is optimal for the strategics.
Now dene q and q such that
Pr
 
D  q = Pr
0@D  q
v2
4vB(v v)   1

+ 1
1A = :
We are now ready to dene the strategicsreaction function:
 (q) =
8<:
1 q  q
 1(q; ) q < q < q
0 q  q
Furthermore, we note that  (q) is decreasing in q: To explain, if q  q, then quantities are
su¢ ciently low that the strategics all purchase in period 1 because the actual probability of a deep
discount is too low (even if they all purchase in period 1). Similarly, if q  q; then quantities
are su¢ ciently high that the stategics all purchase in period 2 because the probability of a deep
discount is su¢ ciently high (even if they all purchase in period 2). For intermediate quantities, the
strategics choose a mixed strategy. Note, (q; ) is increasing in q and , so the inverse,  1(q; );
is unique (and exists for the range q < q < q):
4.3 The rms strategy
Now consider the rms optimal strategy. The rms prot function is
(q) =  cq + pE [minf(1  (1  ))D; qg] + E[R2(D; q)]
:where
E[R2(D; q)] =
Z d^
0
vB (q   (1  (1  ))x) f(x)dx+
Z q
d^
v2
4 (v   v)(1  )xf(x)dx
+
Z q
1 (1 )
q
v2
4 (v   v) (q   (1  (1  ))x) f(x)dx
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It follows that
dE[R2(D; q)]
dq
=
Z d^
0
vBf(x)dx+
Z q
1 (1 )
q
v2
4 (v   v)f(x)dx
= vBF

d^

+
v2
4 (v   v)

F

q
1  (1  )

  F (q)

Furthermore,
E [minf(1  (1  ))D; qg] =
Z q
1 (1 )
0
(1  (1  ))xf(x)dx
+

1  F

q
1  (1  )

q
and
dE [minf(1  (1  ))D; qg]
dq
=

1  F

q
1  (1  )

So
0 (q) = (p  c) 

p  v
2
4 (v   v)

F

q
1  (1  )

+vBF

d^

  v
2
4 (v   v)F (q)
We now establish that there is a unique q that satises 0 (q) = 0; i.e., the rms prot is
quasi-concave in q: Note,
0(0) = (p  c) > 0
(assuming F (0) = 0) and
0(1) =  (c  vB) < 0:
Furthermore
00
f(Q)
=
1
1  (1  )

p  v
2
4 (v   v)
 f  Q1 (1 )
f(Q)
+
vB
v2
4vB(v v)   1

(1  )+ 1
f

d^

f(Q)
  v
2
4 (v   v)
From the MSLR property, 00 is increasing or decreasing, which implies that 0 is either quasi-
concave or quasi-convex, which implies that  is quasi-concave.
Let q() be the rms optimal quantity given : From the implicit function theorem, q() is
increasing in  :
@q()
@
=  
@(q)
@qd
00(q)
> 0:
Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium (; q) such that q = q() and  = (q):
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4.4 Quick Response
This section details the impact of quick response (QR) on equilibrium behavior and prots. As in
the original model, assume that the second order is placed after observing D but before period 1
demand and that order is received in time to satisfy period 1 demand. Units in the second order
cost c2 per unit. Additional units can be procured even if they will be sold in period 2. However,
we assume
v2
4 (v   v) < c2 < p;
and will shortly explain that assumption.
Consider the impact of QR on the rms optimal decisions. If D < d^; the rm prefers to sell
all remaining inventory at vB than to sell a portion of its inventory at sH : The marginal value
of additional units is then vB; so no additional units are ordered at price c2 and the optimal
decision remains to discount at vB: If d^ < D < qr; the rm prefers to sell a portion of its
inventory at sH rather than to take the deep discount. Given that some inventory will not be
sold, the marginal value of additional inventory is zero and no additional product is procured. If
qr < D < qr (1  (1  )) ; the rms inventory in period 2 is less than its potential demand at
the price sH : In this situation the rm may be able to sell additional units. However, the optimal
selling price remains, sH : It is not worthwhile to procure additional units if
 c2 +

v
2 (v   v)

v
2

< 0; (6)
which simplies to
v2
4 (v   v) < c2 :
the rst term in (6) is the marginal cost of an additional unit; the second term has two components,
the rst of which is the probability of selling an additional unit and the second is the revenue if the
unit is sold. If (6) does not hold, then it may be in the interest of the rm to procure additional
units for sale in period 2, which would make the rm even more conservative with its initial purchase
quantity.
As we have established, the rms second period pricing remains unchanged. Therefore, the
strategics reaction function, (q); remains unchanged as well. However, now the rms prot
function is
r(qr) =  c1qr + (p  c2)(1  (1  ))E[D]
+(c2   c1)E [minf(1  (1  ))D; qrg] + E[R2(D; qr)]:
As (q) is quasi-concave in q; it is straightforward to show that r(qr) is quasi-concave in qr as
well. Thus, the rms reaction function, qr() is well behaved and increasing in . Furthermore,
0(q) > 0r(qr);
which implies qr() < q(). When the rm operates QR there exists a unique equilibrium, (r ; qr ),
and the rms initial purchase is smaller than without QR, qr < q:
As in the original model, QR is not necessarily more valuable with strategic consumers than
with just myopic consumers. If all strategic consumers are converted into myopic consumers, the
guaranteed demand in period 1 (at the high selling price of p) is increased. Nevertheless, as in the
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original model, it is possible to construct a condition in which QR is always more valuable with
strategic consumers than without them. As before, we want to know when r = 1 occurs, i.e., qr
is su¢ ciently low that all of the strategics purchase in period 1. If r = 1; we have
r(qr; r = 1) =  c1qr + (p  c2)E[D] + c2E [minfD; qrg] + E[R2(D; qr)]:
=  (c1   vB)qr + (p  c2)E[D] + (c2   vB)E [minfD; qrg]
and the optimal order quantity is
F (qr ) =
c2   c1
c2   vB :
Thus, we have qr  q; which implies r = 1; if
c2   c1
c2   vB 
2 (vM   p)  v24(v v)
3v2 4v2
4(v v)   2vB
 ; (7)
which is analogous to the condition in the original model. Furthermore, if (7) holds, as in the
original model, we know that QR is more valuable with strategic consumers than without them.
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